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INTRODUCTION

The Internet is a truly global community within which myriad eco
nomic, social and technological forces interplay to cause its standardi
zation.1 Much of the competition in the industry has revolved around
which product will become the standard for a given market sector.
Some markets have seen victors; for example, TCP/IP is the Internet
communication protocol,2 MP3 appears to be dominating music com
pression,3 and Microsoft Corporation's Windows ("Windows") is

* I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Julie Cohen, Georgetown University Law Cen
ter and Jason Schultz for their excellent criticisms and suggestions.

1. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 1041, 1042 {1996) (arguing in part "that a variety of economic factors affecting the
computer industry in general, and which apply to the Internet with particular force, make
product standardization in some areas almost inevitable."); Marcus Maher, Note, An Analy
sis ofInternet Standardization, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 'JI 95 {Spring 1998) <http://vjolt.student.
virginia.edu/graphics/vo13/home_art5.html> ("rrJhe Internet has become a vast network of
diverse interests competing to control its future. The interplay of these forces leads the
Internet toward standardization"); William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework For
Global Electronic Commerce (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/
ecomm.htm> ("Standards are critical to the long term commercial success of the Internet as
they can allow products and services from different vendors to work together.").
2 See Maher, supra note 1, 'JI 12.
3. MP3's standard status, however, has raised concern in the recording industry. In re

sponse, at least three companies, Apple, Microsoft, and Real Networks, are vying to produce
the technology that they hope will be adopted by the recording industry as the standard. See
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clearly the standard operating system.4 Similarly, the Internet must
adopt a standard for web browsing and searching, for email, and for
web programming.5 In many cases, the competition for this standard
will be fierce,6 because the winner likely will have intellectual property
rights in the technology and hence reap a significant reward. Such in
centives often are needed for the development of objectively good
standards.7 Yet, as a consequence of granting intellectual property
rights, a monopoly is created in a product that Internet users need.8
Once an Internet technology becomes a standard, how can the owner
of the corresponding copyright be prevented from extracting monop
oly rents and thereby negating the increase in consumer welfare that
the standard created?9
It is an understatement to say that the Internet has become an im
portant communications and commercial network.10 The large num-

John Markoff, Apple Media Software Challenges 2 Rivals: Racing Microsoft and Real Net
works on an Internet Technology, N.Y. nMEs, Apr. 20, 1999, at C2.

4. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1999) ("Currently
there are no products, nor are there likely to be any in the near future, that a significant per
centage of consumers world-wide could substitute for Intel-compatible PC operating systems
without incurring substantial costs.").
5. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1046.
6. Examples of this competition are in the news daily. See Gene Koprowski, A Babel of
Browsers: Web Developers Suffer In Microsoft vs. Netscape War, CHI. TRIB ., Nov. 22, 1998,
at C3 (web programming with Sun Microsystems' Java and challenges to it from Microsoft);
Steve Lohr, Microsoft Goes To Court, N.Y. nMEs, Oct 19, 1998, at Cl (the browser war);
Markoff, supra note 3 (the three-way race over the distribution of multimedia content); John
Markoff, New Program Is Introduced To Ease Use of Linux System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1999, at C2 (Linux's challenge to Microsoft Windows' and Macintosh's dominance); Tom
Stein, Net Instant Messaging Sides Forming, S.F. CHRON., July 30, 1999, at Bl ("instant mes
saging" services provided by the two teams of Microsoft and Yahoo against AOL and
Apple.); Apple's iMac Led Quarter Computer Sales, N.Y. nMEs, Jan. 22, 1999, at C20
(Microsoft Windows' dominance and challenges to it from Macintosh and Linux (an open
standard)).
7. See, e.g., John Swinson, Copyright or Patent or Both: An Algorithmic Approach to
Computer Software Protection, HARV. J.L. & TECH., Fall 1991, at 210 (arguing that at least
some copyright protection is necessary because "[t]here must be incentive to motivate crea
tion of new user interface implementations."). Lemley points out that such rights are neces
sary to preserve the incentive to innovate: if the standard, once adopted, were free for all to
use, developers would have little incentive to enter the initial competition. He points out,
though, that the reward is excessive for this purpose. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1053-54.
8. The United States Constitution gives Congress the authority to grant to autltors the
"exclusive right" to their "writings," and Congress did so in the Copyright Act. See U.S.
CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8.; 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 01-1332 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
9. This Note will discuss copyright protection and not patent or trade secrets because
patent rights are not as uniformly important in monopoly standard cases. Furtlter, trade se
crets protection, which requires secrecy and limited distribution, is unlikely to play a signifi
cant role in Internet standards cases, because standards are not usually secret and are widely
licensed. Trademark rights will enter the picture in some respects, but they are not as prob
lematic because they do not protect the technology itself.
1 0. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway":
Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466 (1995); Ilene
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ber of Internet consumers grants each user the benefit of network ef
fects - the effects of a system whose value to a given user increases
with the number of users of that system - a significant externality
that affects decisions by potential new participants.11 Network effects
are particularly important with regard to the Internet, because the
more users it has, the more valuable it is as an information resource, a
communications tool, and a marketplace for goods and services.12
In fact, the network effect of the Internet would be destroyed were
it not for the adoption of common standards to ensure compatible
communication. For example, computers use the public domain pro
tocol TCP/IP, which allows the network effect to prosper, because it
allows everyone using the Internet to speak the same language.13
Without such compatibility, email messages would not be readable by,
and web pages would not be accessible to, all users; such facile inter
change is precisely the value of being on the network in the first place.
Thus, the need for compatibility also drives the standardization of
Internet protocols and tools, because the network effect requires users
to be on the same network.14
Sun Microsystems ("Sun") created the Java programming language
precisely because of the importance of compatibility. The chief advan
tage of Java is that it permits developers to write a single program in

Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the Global Information Superhighway: A
Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, HARV. J.L. & TECH., Spring, 1995, at 275.
11. This added value rewards the producer of the system for utility it did not itself cre
ate. Examples of such networks are telephones, facsimile machines, email and the Internet.
In all of these cases, the more users each system has, the more important and more efficient
it will be for a new user to join the network. For articles about network effects, see, for ex
ample, Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Effects OfAntitrust and Intellectual Property
Law on Compatibility and Innovation, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 610-13 (1998); Michael L.
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 424 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects,
8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998). Closely related is the virtual net
work, which similarly affects consumer choice based upon consideration of the number of
users, but is not literally a network (like the Windows operating system). See Farrell & Katz,
supra, at 610; Lemley, supra note 1, at 1047-48.
12 See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 46 2, 543 (1998) (noting that network effects are

particularly salient in computer applications and interfaces where "[c]onsumers benefit from
the ability to share files and migrate them between platforms, and from decreased retraining
costs as applications and interfaces become standardized," which describes many of the at
tributes of the Internet); Lemley, supra note 1, at 1045 (arguing that the Internet is clearly
one case in which network effects do have a role to play).
13. See Maher, supra note 1, 'll 4.
14. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1047-49. A third factor, in addition to network effects
and compatibility, also causes standardization: resource commitment (or path dependence),
which is defined as the user's learning of a program's features and storage of data readable
by that program, such as bookmarks. See id. at 1050-51.
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one language that consumers can run on any platfonn15 that is "Java
compatible."16 This "write once, run anywhere" advantage is espe
cially important on the World Wide Web, where host websites need to
upload programs to users' computers in order to allow them to inter
face with the host's computer to, for example, make airline reserva
tions on-line.17 Both ease of use and cost-saving factors are implicated
in the ability to upload universal programs to such users, because users
need not even be aware of the transmission of the program to their
computers, nor worry about whether or not their platforms are com
patible with a given website.18
Sun's vision has serious implications for the vitality of Windows'
virtual network, because with such compatibility, the network effects
that indirectly benefit Microsoft likely would vanish or at least dimin
ish significantly.19 Although users would still need some platform, the
benefit of having the same platform as other network users would de
crease dramatically.
To accomplish its goal of cross-platform compatibility, Sun needed
to incorporate its Java technology into each of the major platforms by
licensing to them its copyrights and trademarks in Java.20 Sun and
15. A platform is "[t]he underlying hardware or software for a system
The term is
often used as a synonym of operating system." PC Webopedia, Platform {last modified May
18, 1998) <http://webopedia.intemetcom/TERM/p/platform.html>. Web browsers, like
Netscape Navigator and Internet Explorer, are software, and could function as platforms as
well. See also Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint, Sun Microsystems, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109 {N.D. Cal. 1998) (No. C 97-20884) (visited Mar. 24,
2000) <http://www.java.sun.com/lawsuit/amend_complaint.html> {discussing the reasons for
Java's development).
. . • •

16. In some cases, such as causing a scanner to operate, this is not completely true, but
the advantage is still present because the job of rewriting the code for other platforms is
proportionately easier since only the platform-specific code need be changed. See Transcript
of Proceedings Before Honorable Ronald M. Whyte, United States District Judge, Septem
ber 10, 1998, Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(No. C 97-20884) (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://web2.java.sun.com/lawsuitlhearing.091098.
html> (hereinafter Transcript].
17. The phrase "Write Once, Run Anywhere" is a Sun trademark and advertising slo
gan. See Java Look and Feel Design Guidelines (visited Apr. 19, 2000) <http://java.sun.com/
products/jlf/dg/notice.html>.
18.

See Transcript, supra note 16.

19. See supra note 11 for a definition of virtual network. Microsoft benefits from the
network effect that its monopoly standard provides, because a consumer's choice is influ
enced by the fact that, if she either buys a computer that cannot run Windows or chooses not
to purchase Windows for a computer that could run it, she will not be able to use as many
software applications, and may have some trouble exchanging information with users of
Windows machines. Cross-platform compatibility would remove this incentive to buy Win
dows and force Microsoft to compete for market share and sales based solely upon the rela
tive merits of its operating system.
20. Although the copyrightability of the Java language itself may be debatable, see infra
note 55, Sun would have copyright protection in the code for its technology. Computer As
soc. Int'I, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 {2d Cir. 1992) ("[I]t is now well settled that the
literal elements of computer programs, i.e., their source and object codes, are the subject of
copyright protection.").
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Microsoft entered into a license agreement in which Microsoft prom
ised that if it made any changes to Java technology to make it
Windows-specific, Microsoft would include pure Java options as well
- options that would keep Java cross-platform compatible.21 Further,
Microsoft's Java implementations would need to pass Sun's compati
bility tests.22 Unsurprisingly, a dispute between Sun and Microsoft de
veloped. Microsoft did make changes that inhibited compatibility and
caused Microsoft's Java products to fail Sun's compatibility tests.23
Sun sued Microsoft and successfully obtained two preliminary injunc
tions; both are in force until the products pass Sun's compatibility
tests.24 It appears likely that Sun will win summary judgment on these
claims as well.25 The dispute is important because it illuminates poten
tial monopoly problems in this arena while serving as an example of
the judicial enforcement of intellectual property rights in a standard,
thereby maintaining the standard's integrity.
While Java presumably has copyright protection,26 this conclusion
is not indisputable. Two commentators have noted that to "the extent

21. See Technology License and Distribution Agreement, § 2.6 (visited Mar. 24, 2000)
<http://www.java.sun.com/lawsuit/document.html> [hereinafter TLDA ].
22 See id.
23. See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1114-17 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (involving a similar injunction to block Microsoft's use of any code derived from
Java); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(involving a preliminary injunction blocking Microsoft's use of the Java logo). Judge Whyte
found that only Java applications written with Microsoft's Java Developer's Kit ("JDK")
would run on Microsoft's Java implementations, forcing programmers to use Microsoft's
JDK if they wanted their Java programs to work on Windows. Consequently, those applica
tions would only run on Windows and Internet Explorer.

24. See Sun, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. Microsoft appears to have at least temporarily com
plied with the injunctions. See Microsoft to Support Java Developers and Consumers in
Complying with Court's Preliminary Ruling, Customer Access to Microsoft Products Not Im
peded (visited Mar. 25, 2000) <http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/1998/Nov98/sunpr.

htin>.
25. Judge Whyte has issued tentative summary judgment rulings in favor of Sun on its
claims. See Tentative Order Granting Sun's Motion for Summary Judgment of Copyright In
fringement and Denying Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Sun's Copyright
Infringement Claim (visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http://java.sun.com/lawsuit/052499copyright.

html>. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the copyright preliminary injunction be
cause the district court failed to find, as a matter of law, that the claim was one that was enti
tled to the presumption of irreparable harm, although it agreed with the district court that
Sun was likely to prevail on the merits. See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188
F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 1999). Judge Whyte heard arguments to determine whether the
injunction should reissue. See John Cook and Dan Richman, Rea/networks Forms Technol
ogy Alliance, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sep. 8, 1999, at F4 ("Sun Microsystems Inc.
on Friday sought to reinstate a federal injunction forcing Microsoft Corp. to conform its op
erating systems, Internet browser and development tools to Sun's Java Native Interface.").
The Judge reinstated the preliminary injunctions based upon unfair competition rather than
copyright, leaving the copyright determination for final summary judgment or trial. See Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C 97-20884 RMW (PVT), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1917, at *40 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2000).
26. Interestingly, Judge Whyte did not question Sun's right to a copyright in Java (and,
in fact, held that it was presumptively valid). See Sun, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. Even
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Sun's assertion of intellectual property rights might preserve the integ
rity of a cross-platform standard that might otherwise be fragmented,
those rights are presently aligned with broader social welfare inter
ests. "27 Thus, Sun's assertion of its copyright and trademark rights in
the standard in this case is unlikely to raise antitrust or anticompetitive
concems,28 because few will worry about Microsoft's unequal bar
gaining power or susceptibility to the control of a monopolist.29 Yet,
there are two reasons to pause for concern. First, this decision will
have precedential power in other situations more likely to raise anti
competitive issues, especially if the exercise of Sun's rights exceeds the
scope of maintaining compatibility
if it were, for example, to try to
control price, development, and access once Java is adopted. Further,
Java, in concert with a web browser like Netscape Navigator, has the
potential simply to replace Windows as the market standard for a plat
form, substituting monopolist for monopolist.30 The only difference is
that Sun publicly has vowed to keep Java an open standard, and has
made much of the technology and specifications public.31 In contrast,
Windows is a closed standard.32 Of course, the question remains as to
-

Microsoft only half-heartedly disputed the copyright, arguing only that the presumption of a
valid copyright from registration was rebutted by the showing of some unoriginal content.
See id.; Brief of Appellant at § VII.A.Le., Microsoft Corp. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 188
F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-15046) (visited Mar. 25, 2000) <http://www.microsoft.com/
presspass/java/Ol-15appealsbrief.htm>. Microsoft likely has self-interested reasons for not
challenging such a ruling.
27. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Com
petitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 765 (1998). For a
definition of social welfare interests, see infra note 37. Essentially, social welfare interests
include the absence of monopoly rent extraction and healthy competition, providing a com
petitive price, as well as the social interest in technological improvement and realization of
the benefits of network effects.
28. See discussion infra Section I.B.
29. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp, 980 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D.D.C. 1997) (discussing
antitrust actions being brought against Microsoft by the Department of Justice for attempts
to monopolize).
30. Java and Netscape would function as a meta-platform, operating "on top or•
Windows or any other operating system, and usurping the user interface function. See
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27, at 770.
31. An open standard or, more generally, an open architecture is an "architecture whose
specifications are public. This includes officially approved standards as well as privately de
signed architectures whose specifications are made public by the designers. The opposite of
open is closed or proprietary." See PC Webopedia, Open Architecture (visited Mar. 25,
1999) <http://webopedia.lntemet.com!fERM/o/open_architecture.html>. See infra Part III
for a discussion of the specific vows Sun has made.
32 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 1999) (stating that
"licensees of Microsoft software were, and are, contractually prohibited from reverse engi
neering, decompiling, or disassembling any software files" - the paradigmatic closed sys
tem).
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whether the public can ensure that Sun does not close the standard or
try to extract monopoly licensing fees once Java is so adopted.33
Some argue that giving intellectual property rights to standards
creates a monopoly problem and a consequential risk of diminution of
social welfare and utility.34 The concern is that standard holders are
able to extract monopoly rents in excess of a normal intellectual prop
erty reward, an occurrence that decreases social welfare.35 But others
counter that there are cases like Java, where such concerns are moot
because Sun is presently using its copyright and trademark rights to
develop, enhance, and maintain an open standard.36 This is important
because one might want to treat the monopolist of an open standard
with more leniency when it is not extracting monopoly rents, but
rather is using its monopoly in procompetitive ways. The incentive
based justifications for intellectual property protection need to be bal
anced against the public interest and consumer welfare justifications.37
This Note suggests how standardization competition can proceed
so as to tame the resulting monopolist, illustrating the debate by con
sidering Java and the dispute involving Microsoft. This Note begins
with the premise that although standards need intellectual property
protection while competing to become the standard, limits should be
imposed upon those rights once the standard is adopted in order to
prevent monopolistic behavior. In Part I, this Note discusses the two
traditional limits that have been applied to such standards in the past
- limiting the scope of copyright protection and antitrust remedies -

33. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27, at 751 (identifying, though not purporting
to address, this problem). Sun has received formal recognition from the ISO to submit its
proprietary product for adoption as a standard, and may already be the "de facto" standard
for web-based programming. See id. at 759.
34. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 1.
35. A closed standard can limit the efficient functioning of the market, slow technologi
cal improvement, and reduce the benefits of network externalities. See Willow A.

Sheremata, Barriers to Innovation: A Monopoly, Network Externalities, and the Speed of
Innovation, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 937 (1997) (discussing the effects of monopoly standards
on innovation, consumer welfare, and the market and suggesting open standards as a way to
mitigate these effects).
36. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27, at 751.
37. Consumer welfare can mean many different things. For the purposes of this Note,
consumer welfare has several components. First, it is the interest against which the "crea
tor's rights" are balanced. See Mark A Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy
ofIntellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 170-71 (1999) (discussing the balance
of creator protection and consumer protection in the intellectual property law). Second, it is
the efficient functioning of a market (for example, the absence of monopoly rent extraction
and healthy competition providing a competitive price). Third, it is the interest in techno
logical improvement: the better the technology is in a standard, the more valuable it should
be to consumers. Fourth, it is the consumers' realization of the benefits of network effects.
Fifth (which may be a part of the first), it is the reservation of a public right implicit in the
grant of a "limited right," i.e., the uncompensated positive externalities or "ancillary social
benefits" that arise from publication of creative works. Cohen, supra note 12, at 547-48
(outlining the ancillary social benefits that are derived from creative works).
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and concludes that the latter is too slow and limited in its effective
ness, while the former too drastic, especially in the case of Java. In
Part II, this Note advocates taking a "middle ground" approach to
limiting enforcement of intellectual property rights in standards
through the use of the copyright misuse doctrine. Finally, Part III
proposes a "modified copyleft"38 to provide added assurance that in
tellectual property owners in standards will be held to their promise to
mitigate, with an open standard, the dangers of enforcing intellectual
property rights, providing another middle ground approach to the ex
treme options outlined in Part I. This Note concludes that the combi
nation of the copyright misuse defense and a modified copyleft con
tract would prevent standard holders from turning around and locking
up the standard, once adopted, with their intellectual property rights.
I.

LIMITING COPYRIGHT: EVALUATING TRADITIONAL
PARADIGMS

This Part analyzes the traditional limitations that have been ap
plied to the enforcement of intellectual property rights in standards.
Section I.A examines the use of the idea/expression doctrine, an ap
proach some courts have used to define the scope of copyright nar
rowly so as to deny protection. It concludes that the results thus ob
tained are too severe, because they deny the copyright holder the
ability to reap the full reward intended in the grant of copyright pro
tection. Section I.B analyzes the use of antitrust actions and concludes
that they are often too slow and ineffective to prevent damage to con
sumer welfare from the anticompetitive exercise of monopoly power.
A.

Delimiting the Scope of Copyright

One way of mitigating the problem of intellectual property rights
in a standard is to deny intellectual property protection to methods of
operation as did the First Circuit in Lotus v. Borland.39 Yet, this Sec-

38. A "copyleft" describes a license agreement under which a copyrighted work is dis·
tributed and which requires that the user must agree not to assert copyright to protect any
improvements or changes he makes, must distribute those changes, if at all, subject to the
same license terms, and must make all source code for those changes publicly available. The
term "copyleft" was coined and explained by Richard Stallman at the GNU project's web·
site.
See Richard Stallman, What is Copyleft?, (last modified Mar. 20, 2000)
<http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/copyleft.html>. The term "copyleft" is also defined and dis
cussed in Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Workl" in the Digital Age, 49
STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1508 (1997). The term herein coined "modified copyleft" is discussed
infra Part ill.
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (listing uncopyrightable subject matter, including a
method of operation, idea, procedure, process, system, concept, principle, and discovery);
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'!, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the
Lotus 1-2-3 menu co=and hierarchy is an uncopyrightable "method of operation"), affd
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tion concludes that the result reached by the Lotus court, effectively
deeming the standard an idea for which copyright protection is un
available, is problematic because companies might not invest the time
required to develop standards if they will not be adequately rewarded
financially.40 In the case of Java, denying copyright protection would
be too harsh because Sun would be unable to protect compatibility,
and consumers would not receive the benefits of cross-platform com
patibility that Java offers.41
Lotus v. Borland involved the literal copying of the menu com
mand hierarchy for the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program by a rival
spreadsheet developer, Borland. Borland felt it necessary to copy this
hierarchy because it had become the industry standard due to Lotus's
dominance in the field.42 In order to accommodate Lotus 1-2-3 users'
path dependence,43 Borland had to make user-written macros44 for
Lotus 1-2-3 interoperable with Borland's spreadsheet (Quattro Pro).
It had to be able to read users' macro instructions according to the
Lotus menu command hierarchy, thus necessitating a literal copy of
the hierarchy in Quattro's code.45 The court held that the Lotus 1-2-3
menu structure was an uncopyrightable "method of operation" under
section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, and thus Borland had not in-

by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); cf. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 11
(criticizing this approach).
40. See David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic Approach, 19
DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1994) (arguing that when standards involve significant devel
opment costs, "the availability and quality of the standard" and the "incentive to produce it"
may depend greatly on the reward provided by intellectual property law).
41. One paramount example, again, is the Microsoft case described infra Section I.B.
42 See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810.
43. See supra note 14 for a definition of path dependence.
44. A macro is a "symbol, name, or key that represents a list of commands, actions, or
keystrokes. Many programs allow you to create macros so that you can enter a single char
acter or word to perform a whole series of actions." PC Webopedia, Macro (last modified
November 6, 1997) <http://webopedia.IntemetcomfTERM/m/macro.ht:ml>. This is another
example of "resource commitments" or "path dependence" that needs to be overcome for a
competitor to oust an entrenched standard holder and allow free competition. See supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
45. It did not, however, copy the underlying code for this menu structure. See Lotus, 49
F.3d at 810. A literal copy was necessary because the macros were written by reference to
the first letter of the name of each menu or submenu in 1-2-3 (for example, F for "File"),
requiring Quattro Pro to include the 1-2-3 menu and submenu names and structure (the
"menu command hierarchy") within its code.
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fringed Lotus's copyright.46 In other words, the court called Lotus's
menu hierarchy an "idea" rather than an "expression."47
While this result allowed Borland to compete effectively with the
standard holder, the ramifications were severe. The court's conclusion
allows any competitor to use Lotus's hierarchy, regardless of whether
the competitor offers a better product, a result that is difficult to jus
tify.48 To deny copyright protection to 1-2-3 because it "was so innova
tive that it occupied the field and set a de facto industry standard" is,
as an earlier case noted, to "have flipped copyright on its head,"49 be
cause the explicit aim of copyright is to secure to authors the exclusive
right to their writings exactly so they can reap the rewards of a popular
work.50 In the case in which this argument was made, another soft
ware developer's copying of Lotus 1-2-3 was "overwhelming and per
vasive," especially in comparison to Borland's copying of only the
menu hierarchy. Had the Lotus court's approach been used in the
earlier case, the result would have been especially severe - the com
petitor would have been allowed to pirate the Lotus 1-2-3 program
features solely because of its standard status.51 This has led some crit
ics to argue that copyright is no longer an appropriate doctrine to pro
tect network features of computer software at all.
Because the

46. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815. It is important not to misunderstand the result here. The
court did not deem the Lotus code, which is explicitly granted protection by § 117 of the
Copyright Act, to be a "method of operation," but rather found the hierarchy or interface,
which is the manifestation of the code, to be a "method of operation." See id. To analogize
this to a literary work, the court would protect the written text (code), but not the resulting
story (the interface).
47. Fundamental copyright principles dictate that copyright protects only the expression
of an idea, not the idea itself, and this principle is reflected in § 102(b)'s list of uncopy
rightable subject matter. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)
(holding that copyright protects more than just the literal text, but does not extend as far as
protecting the ideas expressed therein; in this case it did not protect the "idea" of a story de
picting the quarrel between a Jewish and Irish Father, the marriage of their children, the
birth of grandchildren, and a reconciliation).
It could be stated alternatively that the idea "merged" with the expression as in Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The effect is the same either way - copyright protection fails.
The court suggested that it might consider the "long prompts" (short phrases describing the
menu choices) under the merger doctrine if the issue were before the court on appeal. See
Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815-16 n.9.
48. Judge Boudin's concurrence would have adopted a different approach: it would al
low a privileged use where the competitor is not seeking to appropriate Lotus's advances but
is seeking to aid interoperability (allowing consumers to switch between competing pro
grams) and to prevent path dependence (see supra notes 14 and 44 for a definition). This
approach, he said, "would not automatically protect Borland if it had simply copied the
Lotus menu (using different codes), contributed nothing of its own, and resold Lotus under
the Borland label." Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring). This approach, however,
has never been used explicitly by a court.
49. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. 37, 79 (D. Mass. 1990).
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
51. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. at 79.
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Copyright Act explicitly protects computer programs, however, this
argument must fail.52
Although one interpretation of what the Lotus court did appears at
first blush to be procompetitive, it rests on a faulty premise. One view
of the effect of Lotus is that it forced the competing standards to be
interoperable, allowing consumers to switch back and forth between
them, and permitting the better product to win the standard competi
tion.53 This has the advantage of not stranding those customers who
choose the losing standard, because their files, programs, or hardware
would be compatible with the winning standard. This advantage re
duces the tendency of consumers to choose the firm they believe will
succeed, rather than the one that has the better, if different, standard
("market tipping").54 Thus, the Lotus approach might offer one feasi
ble way to address a case like Sun's, not explicitly fleshed out by
commentators - disallowing Sun's intellectual property rights in the
Java language itself.55 This approach would force Sun to compete with
others over whose Java virtual machine, which runs Java programs,
will become the standard.56
52 See Peter S. Mennen, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection of Network
Features of Computer Software, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 651 (1998) (interpreting the purposes
of copyright and recent court decisions to mean that such protection actually is not available
for these features, nor should it be). But see Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles ofPatent
and Copyright in the Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARsHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 41, 50-56 (1998) (asserting that even though the code could be a "method of opera
tion" or "process," denying protection in this fashion would be contrary to congressional
intent in providing copyright protection to computer software code).
53. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1060 n.64 (suggesting such an approach for standardiza
tion competition); see also Sheremata, supra note 35, at 961.
54. See Sheremata, supra note 35, at 958-59 and 941 (discussing the ways in which stan
dards can and do compete, the effect of market tipping, and the convincing evidence that
DR-DOS, the competing product to MS-DOS, was a far superior product but did not be
come the standard because of Microsoft's dominant market position). Market tipping that
results in an inferior standard being chosen is not in the best interests of consumer welfare.
55. Cf. Seth A. Cohen, To Innovate or Not to Innovate, That is the Question: The Func
tions, Failures, and Foibles of the Reward Function Theory of Patent Law in Relation to
Computer Software Platforms, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1 (Nov. 23, 1998)
<http://www.mttlr.org/volfive/cohen.html> (discussing a similar proposal for restriction of
patent rights in computer software platforms to promote "rivalry").
There has been some doubt expressed that a computer language itself is copyrightable,
although it is patentable if it meets the general patent qualifications. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. 37, 72 (D. Mass. 1990); see also Pamela Samuelson, Com
puter Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) ofthe Copyright Act of1976: A Critique
of Lotus v. Paperback, L. & CONTE.MP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 311, 334-35 & n.109 (dis
cussing the Paperback court's handling of the copyright issue). Sun does not, however, nec
essarily claim rights to the language as such, but rather to the "technology" that implements
the code like the Virtual Machine, Java Native Interface, JDK, and class libraries, as well as
constant improvements and upgrades. See TLDA, supra note 21, § 2.l(a). Furthermore, it
seems clear that the virtual machine itself would be copyrightable (and patentable), because
it is just the type of computer program the Copyright Act was amended to protect. See supra
note 52.
56. Different computer chips (like the Pentium or PowerPC) have different specifica
tions for what series of ones and zeroes are needed to perform a given function. What is of-
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The market-tipping effect, however, cannot be so easily avoided the competition for the adoption of a standard will simply drop down
to the next level, and focus, in Sun's case, on whose virtual machine
will become the standard.57 Even with interoperability, people will
tend to use the product they think is likely to become the standard or
the one with the most convenient distribution channels, such as a
company like Microsoft that is dominant in other areas.58 This may be
just what happened to 1-2-3 after the Lotus case - Lotus's inability to
enforce a copyright in its interface played a part in its demise as the
market leader for spreadsheets and in the ascendance of Microsoft
Excel.59 The end result is merely a transfer of monopolies. This does
little to resolve the substantive monopoly and incentive problems; the
winner of the new competition will still have a monopoly in a stan
dard, and the original standard holder still forfeits its entitlement to a
copyright reward. Further, the Lotus-type interoperability mandate
would not permit Sun, for example, to maintain the cross-platform
compatibility features, the very benefit that the standard brings in the

ten referred to as a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) parses the Java code and "translates" it to
the computer chip's specific code. The JVM is not usually a piece of hardware like the chip
- hence it is a "virtual" machine - but rather software that runs "on top or• the operating
system, bypassing the necessity of writing several versions of a program, each with chip
specific code. The JVM must produce these individual computer chip instructions, so each
JVM is specific to the type of computer chip. See MARY CAMPIONE & KATHY WALRATH,
1liE JAVA TurORIAL: 0BJECT-0RIENIED PROGRAMMING FOR TIIE INTERNET 4-5 (1998).
57. This is just what has happened with email, for example. The standard is established
and non-proprietary, which has the same effect as making the standard interoperable, but it
can be argued that the "next level" for which there is now fierce competition is "instant mes
saging," where compatibility is seen as antithetical to capturing an installed base. See Stein,
supra note 6. At one point Lemley notes that such a JVM competition may result from in
dependent development of Java bytecodes with non-Java programming languages. See
Lemley, supra note 1, at 1052 n.36.
58. Both of these tendencies are illustrated in the "browser wars" between Microsoft
and Netscape. That consumers would tend to use the product they believed to be the winner
or likely winner was reflected in Microsoft's belief that development of a superior product in
Internet Explorer and offering it for free would not be sufficient to dislodge Netscape from
its market-leading position. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 37
(D.D.C. 1999). That people tend to use a product with convenient distribution channels is
illustrated by Microsoft's attempt to restrict Netscape's access to such channels in order to
gain market share for Internet Explorer. Id. at 38.
59. The decision certainly prevented Lotus from reaping the rewards of establishing the
industry standard. It may be that cognizant of this risk, Lotus was unwilling or unmotivated
to develop a better interface, as did Microsoft in Excel. If for no other reason, the result is
severe because Lotus lost the right to be rewarded for its "writings" into which it had poured
large sums of money and time in development It is doubtful that Lotus would have invested
the resources into such development if it would not have been able to protect the product at
all, in other words, to recoup its investment See Friedman, supra note 40, at 1122. To be
fair, the court did not deny protection to all of 1-2-3, just to the menu hierarchy, but it essen
tially enabled Borland to copy that which had become one of 1-2-3's most useful features:
the way in which 1-2-3 made simple the writing and executing of macros.
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first place, because it could not prevent licensees like Microsoft from
developing incompatible versions of Java technology.60
One commentator has suggested, along the lines of Lotus, that to
foster competition and innovation by limiting the intellectual property
rights of the standard holder, copyright law ought to adopt the patent
idea of "blocking" to protect improvements.61 The idea of blocking
patents is that the improver can, by securing a patent, block the origi
nal patent holder from making that improvement herself. The im
prover, however, cannot use the improvement because it is based
upon a previously granted patent - thus, both parties are blocked
from using the improvement, hopefully an incentive to negotiation.62
Such an approach, it is argued, would protect these improvers by pro
viding the protection for improvement that copyright traditionally de
nies authors of unauthorized derivative works and would further the
incentives that copyright is meant to encourage: progress, innovation,
and protection of new expression.63 This approach would accomplish
what the Lotus court did, allowing Borland to improve upon 1-2-3, but
would arguably not be as drastic, because it would only have pre
vented Lotus from capitalizing on Borland's improvement, and would
not have diminished the protection Lotus had for 1-2-3.
This proposition, however, is not much better than Lotus because
it would require either a statutory change or the overruling of many
precedents.64 Unless Congress changed the basic tenets of copyright

60. In order to maintain the utility of the network effect (cross-compatibility), Sun
would have to have some control over the use of the Java "network," but it need not control
access to the specifications which are now public, nor control who can write programs in
Java, much like Microsoft can for Windows. The recent antitrust litigation by the Depart
ment of Justice has focused on this control. The estimate of Windows' market share is usu
ally 90%. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 & 98-1233, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14231, at *11 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998). Trademark rights in JAVA enable Sun to enforce
compatibility requirements - ensuring that programs written in Java will run on any plat
form - because if claims of compatibility were untrue, Sun could enjoin the competitors
under the Lanham Act This point mitigates against the preservation of copyright protection
(it does not need copyright to protect compatibility), but the fact that no one need license
the trademark to market a product as compatible (if it is) favors maintaining copyright pro
tection to preserve the incentive to innovate. Thus, both trademark and copyright protec
tion are necessary. Irrespective of the standard status of Java, there is no compelling reason
to restrict trademark rights in a standard where the company has invested in building the
brand name. Trademark law provides a remedy if the mark unduly inhibits competition be
cause of its "monopoly" status: genericide, which is beyond the scope of this Note.
61. See Mark A. Lemley, Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75

TEXAS L. REV. 989, 992 (1997).

62. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case ofBlocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
63. This change would evidently be accomplished by analogy to patent law and through
the fair use doctrine. See Lemley, supra note 61, at 992.

64. The Copyright Act nowhere provides for blocking copyrights, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 1011205 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); it specifically prohibits unauthorized derivative works, see 17
U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994), and there is a long history of court cases finding such improvements
to be infringing, see, e.g., Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341
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law, this approach would not be helpful, because copyright law, unlike
patent law, allows for independent creation.65 Thus, suppose a Sun
competitor improves upon Java and seeks protection under this ap
proach. She could only do so if Sun was unable to independently cre
ate this improvement, because once Sun learned of the idea, it could
create its own expression of this idea without violating her blocking
copyright.66 Furthermore, Sun's access to her idea would not satisfy
the access requirement for infringement, because the idea is not copy
rightable.67 She would only be protected from Sun's literal copying of
her code. Moreover, given the pace at which companies such as Sun
innovate, it is unlikely that it would need her code. Thus, neither the
approach adopted in Lotus, nor any approach derived therefrom, is
capable of adequately addressing the problems presented by internet
standardization.
B.

Antitrust Enforcement

Antitrust enforcement presents a possible approach to the problem
of Internet standardization, as it is the traditional response to concerns
regarding a monopolist.68 This Section acknowledges that there are
some limited circumstances where antitrust enforcement can be useful,
often after a standard is adopted. But this Section argues that, in most
cases, antitrust is too slow and its remedies too blunt to be an effective
tool for remedying the monopoly and incentive problems inherent in
internet standardization cases such as the Java dispute.

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming summary judgement for plaintiff where defendant purchased cop
ies of book, cut out pictures, glued them with a border to tiles, and sold them).
65. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) ("If evidence of access is absent,
the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that the plaintiff and defen·
dant independently arrived at the same result.").
66. See supra note 47.
67. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, L.)
("defendants were entitled to use . . . even the plaintiffs' contribution itself, if they drew
from it only the more general patterns; that is, if they kept clear of its 'expression.' ").
68. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994), prohibits unreasonable restraints of
trade, like price fixing, under Section 1 but this Section does not play a significant role in
standardization any more than it does in any other industry. Section 2's prohibitions on mo
nopolization and attempts to monopolize are the source of antitrust power in the standardi
zation case; by definition, a standard with copyright protection has a monopoly. See supra
note 8 and accompanying text. Of course, the granting of intellectual property rights by
Congress carries with it an exemption from the antitrust laws; that is, a copyright holder is
not guilty of attempting to monopolize just because she registers her copyrighted work. The
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994), provides jurisdiction to the Federal Trade Commis
sion (FTC) under Section 18 to approve mergers and acquisitions where "the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.''
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One way that antitrust can protect post-adoption69 standard com
petition is that the government can compel licensing or interoperabil
ity through antitrust decrees or as a condition for the approval of
mergers.70 But as a tool for balancing the competing interests, anti
trust is limited, because it requires that the standard holder's activities
be proscribed by antitrust law or that they fall under the purview of
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). An interesting example is
the compulsory license imposed upon West Publishing for its star
pagination system, which a court had determined was copyrightable,
as a condition for approval of its purchase by Thompson.71 In many
ways, West's pagination system is a standard in the legal community
that resembles a network and has many of the same characteristic
network effects. There is an added value to the network in being able
to use one standard citation for a case because it enables quick and ac
curate identification of the authority, and the more that users adopt
this standard, the more valuable and efficient it becomes.72 The gov
ernment evidently recognized this anticompetitive concern and made
the standard, in effect, interoperable, meaning that anyone could li
cense it on a reasonable basis,73 thereby forcing West to compete in
other areas. This requirement prevents West from being able to lev
erage its monopoly over the standard into market share in the bur
geoning electronic database market.74 In such cases, there could
69. This Note will differentiate between the competition among various possible stan
dards before the "market" settles on one from the competition between the standard holder
and those competitors who seek to oust the standard by referring to the former as pre
adoption competition and the latter as post-adoption competition.
70. For a review of cases where the government has used antitrust to protect post
adoption standard competition in such ways, see James P. Love, A Free Trade Area for the

Americas: A Consumer Perspective on Proposals as They Relate to Rules Regarding Intel
lectual Property (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.cptech.org/pharm/belopaper.html>.
71. See United States v. Thomson Corp., No. 96-1415, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2790, at
*20 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1997); United States v. Thomson Corp., No. 96-1415, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1893, at *9 {D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997); United States v. Thomson Corp., 949 F. Supp. 907
(D.D.C. 1996) (approving a complex settlement that requires West to license its star pagina
tion); see also West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 {8th Cir. 1986)
{finding the star pagination system copyrightable as a compilation). The decision in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural TeL Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 {1991), which found that the "white
pages" are not original enough to be copyrightable under the Constitution or the Copyright
Act, likely increased West's willingness to agree to a settlement in this case.
72. The West Reporters are often the required citation. See THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION § 10.3.l{b), at 62 {16th ed. 1996) (instructing that citation to
a computer database should be used only if a regional, official, or preferred unofficial re
porter, many of which are West's, is not available).
73. Of course, the government could also have made West "license" the system for free,
although this would have been in conflict with the Eighth Circuit's decision in West Publish
ing, 799 F.2d at 1223.
74. This latter market ostensibly would have been cornered in large part by West were it
not for this compulsory license, because Bluebook form requires citation to West's page
numbers. See THE BLUEBOOK, supra note 72, § 10.3.l{b), at 62. This would essentially
translate into a lock on the electronic database market for published case law. The extent of
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hardly be a better solution, because there is no danger of inadvertently
diminishing the scope of copyright protection for works that are not
the subject of network effects, because there is no precedent estab
lished.75 Nor would one worry about the anticompetitive effects in
these cases, because the copyright owner has agreed to license the
work while maintaining its copyright.76 But again, the limited circum
stances under which this type of remedy can be used - in mergers and
settlement decrees - reduce its effectiveness. In the case of Java,
such remedies would be of limited use because Sun has neither exhib
ited anticompetitive behavior nor attempted any large scale mergers,
but that proves the larger point that the remedies can be effective in
important situations.
Antitrust enforcement can sometimes help during the pre
adoption standards competition as well. Some commentators argue
that antitrust enforcement should be used to police anticompetitive
conduct during the period of competition for the adoption of the stan
dard to ensure that the best standard is adopted, instead of the stan
dard of the firm with the most leveraging power.77 Surely Sun's ac
tions during the time it is competing to have Java adopted as the
standard should be scrutinized for anticompetitive conduct under the
antitrust laws, just as any firm's would be. And when it enters into
agreements such as the AOL/Netscape merger, an agreement to pur
chase various assets from Netscape and to provide certain services to
the new AOL/Netscape combination,78 the FTC has the ability to bal
ance consumer welfare interests with those of Sun in ways similar to
those employed in the West purchase mentioned above.79 Such ac
tions have little built-in disincentive for innovation and pose little
the market share garnered by West would have been limited to those situations where pin
point cites are required, which includes, at the very least, all academic legal writing, although
arguably not necessary for the practitioner who may or may not conform to the Bluebook.
Even in the latter case, however, such practitioners might choose to use Westlaw (West's
online database) exclusively just because of the times when it is more convenient to cite to a
West page.

75. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 11, at 540 (identifying "the problem the First
Circuit confronted in the Lotus case: how to craft an intellectual property rule that will en
hance social welfare in network effects cases without inflicting too much damage on the fun.
damental tenets of intellectual property law in the majority of cases where network effects
do not play a role.").
76. See United States v. Borland Int'l, Inc., No. C 91-3666, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5095,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1992) (reporting a similar solution when Borland acquired Ashton
Tate, the producer of the "dBase" standard: Borland was required to forego "initiating or
making any claim or counterclaim that asserts claims of copyright infringement in the com
mand names, menu items, menu command hierarchies, command languages, programming
languages and file structures used in and recognized by Ashton-Tate's dBase family of prod
ucts
").
. . • .

77. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27, at 727.
78. See Sun-America Online Tenns Disclosed, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1999, at C20.
79. See United States v. Thomson Corp., 949 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
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danger to the rights of a standard holder, because they only arise when
companies either engage in anticompetitive behavior or attempt to
merge or purchase competitors.80 In other words, the restrictions are
self-imposed to a large extent.81 Unfortunately, such remedies are
consequently limited in reach.82
Despite these two limited circumstances when antitrust is helpful,
there are several good reasons why antitrust is not well equipped to
handle all of the problems of Internet standardization. First, antitrust
actions are notoriously slow; the IBM case spanned thirteen years,83
the AT&T case nine years,84 and the ongoing case against Microsoft
began in 1990.85 By the time the IBM case was over, it no longer
seemed the daunting monopolist it once had been, and not because of
any antitrust remedy.86 Rather, the market had changed much faster
than the antitrust case could proceed.87 Although such cases might
proceed more quickly against companies not quite as large as IBM,

80. Although such restrictions may in truth reduce the incentive to innovate because the
possibility of excessive monopolistic rewards is reduced, the most important incentive that for which the Constitution provides a copyright - remains intact.
81. The restrictions are self-imposed because they can only be instituted if the firm is
anticompetitive or if it attempts to merge with or purchase other companies - both actions
within its control.
82. See United States v. Thomson Corp., 949 F. Supp. 9CJ7 (D.D.C. 1996) (discussing the
agreement entered into when Thomson sought to purchase West); United States v. Thomson
Corp., No. 96-1415, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2790, at *20 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 1997); United States
v. Thomson Corp., No. 96-1415, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1893, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997)
(discussing the difficulties in enforcing the consent degree approved of in the decision of
March 7, 1997); United States v. Borland Int'I, Inc. and Ashton-Tate Corp., No. C 91-3666
(MHP), filed Oct. 17, 1991, CJ[ IV(A) (discussing the final judgment between the United
States and Borland when Borland acquired Ashton-Tate).
83. See PlnLLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
TEXT, CASES 67 (5th ed. 1997).
84. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (commencing in 1974).

PROBLEMS,

affd sub nom.

85. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.RD. 318, 334-35 (D.D.C. 1995) (dis
cussing the Federal Trade Commission action against Microsoft beginning in 1990, and the
instant action brought by the Justice Department), rev'd 56 F3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995};
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999); see also B. MacAllister, The Big Case: Procedural
Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1950) ("Prolonged proceedings and a
massive record are almost inevitable . . . for the rules of law that have been developed, with
respect to both the offense and the proof which may be adduced, generally permit the entire
history of a major company or industry to be placed in issue.").
86. The government moved for an outright dismissal of the case just before the end of
the trial. See In re IBM Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 600-603 (1982) (granting mandamus directing
district judge to cease consideration of the case).
87. Interestingly, Microsoft makes the same argument about the present antitrust case
against it, and argues that the computer/Internet market (characterized by network effects)
is so different from standard markets that antitrust law should view Microsoft's tactics dif
ferently. See Setting the Record Straight: Microsoft Statement on Government Lawsuit (vis
ited Mar. 29, 2000} <http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/doj/10-13record.htm>.
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AT&T, or Microsoft, even significantly shorter times would still be too
lengthy, especially in the fast-changing world of technology.88
Second, antitrust remedies have a "blunt hand." Specifically, they
can be unduly harsh, and, as a threat, they can inhibit innovation.89 In
the absence of anticompetitive behavior to enjoin, or acquisitions that
require the FTC's approval, the most likely remedy a court would or
der in an antitrust case is a restructuring of the company.90 In such
situations, "antitrust is a fairly blunt instrument,"91 because forcing di
vestiture of the standard or prohibiting a firm from competing in the
market does little to remedy the monopoly status of the standard. In
stead, it merely changes the owner, and it is still severe and poses a
veritable threat. In a case like Java, such structural relief cannot com
pel the maintenance of its open specifications.92 Spinning off the Java
standard into the hands of a new company does little to remedy the
consumer welfare concerns that accompany a closed standard.
Moreover, absent some method of guaranteeing that the standard will

88. The median total length from complaint to termination of private antitrust cases is
17 months. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis ofPrivate Anti
trust Litigation, 14 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1009 (1986). Even the government's trial against Micro
soft, which has received praise for its brevity, still took eight months from the beginning of
testimony to the release of the findings of fact See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). The time frame for developing a standard varies with the tech
nology and market factors, but it would seem that a one to three year range is typical. See
Charles W. L. Hill, Establishing a Standard: Competitive Strategy and Technological Stan
dards in Winner-take-all Industries, ACAD. OFMGMT. EXECUTIVE 7, May 1997 at 7, 12 (cit
ing the rapid industry acceptance of a standard for CD technology once Sony and Philips
agreed on a standard - over 30 companies agreed to license the technology within 2 years,
and a technological development time of 3 years for a competing CT scanner); Julie Pitta,
Format Wars, FORBES, July 7, 1997, at 266 (detailing the competition between Adobe
Systems' PostScript document format and Xerox's rival format standard, noting that after
two years, a standards committee approved a standard that was a combination of the two
formats, by which time PostScript had been adopted by the market, so that the committee's
standard was worthless).
89. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27, at 770-71.
90. The possibility of courts requiring a firm to predisclose or license its standard has
been rejected repeatedly. See, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (1994) (patentee has the right not to
license its patent); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 284-85 (2d Cir.
1979) (holding that Kodak has no obligation to predisclose interface specifications of its new
cameras to film makers, notwithstaading that Kodak would have temporary control over the
film market as well); United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission,
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) <JI
13,132, at § 22 (April 6, 1995) (possession of market power does not impose an antitrust ob
ligation to license intellectual property); Lemley, supra note 1, at 1070.
91. See Penelope A. Preovolos, Litigation in the Interface: Connecting to 'Essential Fa
cilities': Will Antitrust Law Developed to Unblock the Monopolies ofRailroads be Applied to
Open Interoperability for the Infonnation Superhighway?, IP WORLDWIDE, Mar. 1995 (vis
ited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://www.ipmag.com/preovolos.html> ("The antitrust laws have been
employed to address problems of this sort only in rare, albeit dramatic, instances. The anti
trust laws are geared to address anticompetitive acts, not to force a firm that has achieved
great success legitimately, by being the best innovator or the most effective marketer, to
share the rewards of its efforts with others.").
92 See supra note 90.
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remain open, the new owner cannot be prevented from acting just as
its predecessor did. Again, the Internet is naturally driven toward
standardization. Despite the fact that the winner of the standard
competition receives too great a windfall upon adoption,93 standards
are efficient and necessary for the operation of the Intemet.94 The
threat of antitrust action upon the firm after the technology is adopted
as a standard is, if effective, also counterproductive because it could
deter the development of such standards.95
Third, antitrust cannot address anticompetitive licensing provisions
that fall short of Sherman Act violations.96 In a case like Sun's, this
shortcoming is particularly conspicuous. Sun is not yet a monopolist,
because Java has arguably not yet been adopted as a standard.97 In
addition, there is no evidence that Sun has engaged in anticompetitive
or monopolistic conduct that might bring it under Sections 1 or 2 of
the Sherman Act.98 The Microsoft antitrust case in progress was only
initiated once Netscape was injured, by which time AOL had moved
in to acquire it.99 Thus the antitrust action, at least insofar as it is
seeking to ensure fair competition in the browser market, may be
moot. Antitrust law would allow Sun, with impunity, to champion
Java as an open standard in order to push for its adoption and then
close the standard once adopted.
Fourth, some antitrust remedies threaten to severely diminish the
incentive structure in place to promote "the useful arts."100 The gov
ernment's antitrust action against Microsoft has led at least one com
mentator to argue that the essential facilities doctrine, which forces
the monopolist to allow competitors to use its facilities, is an appropri
ate remedy for monopoly leveraging of electronic networks by en
trenched monopolists holding proprietary rights to standards, like

93. The reward is at least a greater incentive for innovation than is needed. See Farrell
& Katz, supra note 11, at 638 (stating that the winner of a standards competition may be
over rewarded); Lemley, supra note 1, at 1060 n.64.
94. See Farrell & Katz, supra note 11; Friedman, supra note 40.
95. To the extent that such rewards are a necessary incentive for the standard develop·
ment, which is often, but not always, true. See Farrell & Katz, supra note 11; Friedman, su
pra note 40.
96. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
97. Sun had submitted but then withdrew applications to the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) and ECMA (a European standards body). See Amy Zuckerman,
Rules on the Way for Tech Suppliers, J. COM., Dec. 29, 1999, at 8.
98. Enforcing one's copyright does not constitute a Sherman Act antitrust violation. In
fact, there would be no antitrust violation in Sun's decision to close the Java standard. See
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
99. See Sun-America Online Terms Disclosed, supra note 78.
100. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress may allow authors copyright
protection pursuant to Congress's power "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec
tive writings and discoveries . . . .").
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Windows.101 The commentator posits that "[a] guarantee of open ac
cess to Windows would insure that consumers could choose among a
variety of suppliers for word processing, spreadsheets, data bases,
browsers, and other applications that run on Windows."102
Yet the argument that it would not punish Microsoft is unpersua
sive. Requiring Microsoft to open its code to the world is something
that would deter further innovation on its part.103 Although such a
remedy would indeed help other software manufacturers, it does not
provide sufficient incentive for the development of standards, a proc
ess which requires enormous resources which only will be invested if
commensurate rewards can be expected.104 If the next standard holder
must worry that its proprietary code will become an essential facility,
the information economy may end up mired in a technological stand
still because firms will have insufficient incentive to invest the neces
sary resources to develop standards.
On the other hand, if a firm gets to the point where its standard is
important enough to become an essential facility, it may be willing to
lose control over it because it has recouped its costs and profited im
mensely. This argument is based upon the premise that all standards
reward their creators relatively quickly, which may not always be true.
It also does not address the concern that the owner of the standard
would have far less incentive to offer improvements or upgrades to its
standard. If Microsoft were required to treat Windows as an essential
facility, two problems would emerge. First, once the next version of
Windows is released, the "facility" would be different, and the solu
tion moot. Second, if all successive versions of Windows were to be

101. See Thomas A Piraino Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by
Electronic Networks, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 50-63 (1998). Cf. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra
note 83, at 501 (the essential facilities doctrine "acts to preclude the dominant firm in an in
dustry from refusing to grant competitors access to its essential facilities"); MCI Comm. v.
AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
102. Piraino, supra note 101, at 7.
103. Cf. Farrell & Katz, supra note 11, at 648 (discussing the potential effects of antitrust
on innovation, concluding: "Public policy regarding the mandatory sharing of an interface
must balance adverse effects on the incentive to improve the interface against the positive
competitive effects from sharing it once it has been created. By and large, when the creation
of an interface involves large costs and great ingenuity, the adverse innovation incentive ef
fects are likely to be relatively strong.").
104. See Hill, supra note 88, at 15 (discussing the "hundreds of millions of dollars" that
Philips has spent on trying to develop its Digital Compact Cassette technology); Karjala, su·
pra note 52, at 50. For examples of software development costs, see Dickerman Assocs., Inc.
v. Tiverton Bottled Gas Co., 594 F. Supp. 30, 32 (D. Mass. 1984) (discussing the develop·
ment time of 22 man months until first sale and additional 12 months to first installation, at a
cost of $400,000); Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (E.D.
Mich. 1971) (development cost of $2 million for programs and related time-sharing technol
ogy), affd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Management Sys.
Corp., 366 N.W.2d 366, 367-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing the initial $100,000 for re
search and development and subsequent "substantial capital investment" over eight to ten
years for later version).
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considered essential facilities, it is unlikely that Microsoft would con
tinue to invest the same amount of time and resources into its devel
opment.
Antitrust, then, is not often capable of providing ex post protection
from a standard's intellectual property rights monopoly because of its
tendency toward slowness and severity, frequent powerlessness, and
potential to inhibit innovation and creativity. Thus, two of the most
commonly suggested and implemented solutions, discussed in this
Part, for the remedy of monopoly control over a standard fail to
achieve an effective balance between the protection of producer in
centives and of consumer welfare interests in a competitive market
place. Limiting the scope of copyright, as did the Lotus court, is too
dangerous to innovation, and antitrust's hand is too slow and too blunt
to be effective.

II.

THE COPYRIGHT MISUSE DEFENSE

There is a middle ground between the two approaches outlined in
Part I that catches anticompetitive behavior that antitrust dqes not
and that avoids the problems inherent in a Lotus-type approach. This
approach is the copyright misuse defense, and it can be invoked in con
tract or infringement actions.105 It achieves an appropriate balance be
tween consumer welfare needs and the maintenance of an adequate
incentive structure for innovators, and it also addresses anticompeti
tive licensing provisions.106 Because copyright misuse does not require
actions that would. otherwise be a violation of the antitrust laws, its in
vocation may be more effective.107 This Part explores the brief history
of copyright misuse and its potential application in Internet standardi
zation cases. It concludes that copyright misuse indeed may be helpful
in addressing some of the problems outlined so far in this Note. By
providing a defense to those sued by a copyright owner like Sun, for
example, copyright misuse can keep such standard holders from clos
ing their standards and enforcing their rights through infringement ac
tions. Yet, this Part will also show that the defense is somewhat new
and the scope of its application unclear, so there is still a need for a
clearer ceiling to standard holders' rights.108

105. Lasercomb, decided in 1990, is regarded as the first case to seriously apply this
middle ground. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
106. See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1999)
(requiring users of its copyrighted software to use its hardware as well); Lasercomb, 911 F.2d
at 978 (discussing the ninety-nine year prohibition on the licensee's development of sinillar
software).
107. See supra Section I.B.
108. See infra Part III.
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The copyright misuse defense was first established in Lasercomb v.
Reynolds,1(Y) which allowed the defense to an infringement action if the
copyright was being "used in a manner violative of the public policy
embodied in the grant of a copyright."110 In that case, the copyright
holder attempted to prevent its licensees, through contract provisions,
from independently innovating a competing product for ninety-nine
years.111 The licensee in the case actually had never signed the con
tract, but the court held that the defense was not limited to those sub
ject to such anticompetitive contract provisions.112
The application of copyright misuse in Lasercomb has much
broader implications.113 This is important in the context of the Inter
net and particularly in the case of Java, because Sun's practice of
keeping Java open is not based in contract language. Thus, having the
copyright misuse defense applied in non-contract cases broadens its
applicability. For example, the holding of DSC Communications v.
DGI Technologies,114 another case in which the defense was success
fully used, was not restricted to anticompetitive contract provisions
like those targeted in Lasercomb.115 The Court of Appeals based its

109. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d 970. See also Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult
Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 865 n.27 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing the copyright misuse defense).
110. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
111. See id. at 973.
112 See id. at 977. It did, however, base its finding of misuse upon such contract provi
sions - it just allowed any would-be infringer to rely on the misuse defense regardless of
whether it was under such a contract The court explicitly rejected the notion that the
charge had to rise to the level of an antitrust violation. See id. at 978.
113. The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have recog
nized the copyright misuse defense. See, e.g., Practice Mgmt Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d
516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting the defense and finding misuse); Service & Training, Inc.
v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 690 (4th Cir. 1992); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Bou
tiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991); United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publ'g Co., 855
F.2d 604, 610-12 (8th Cir. 1988); CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 607 F.2d 543, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1979).
The other circuits have expressed support for the proposition. See, e.g., Data General Corp.
v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1169-70 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Lasercomb
with approval); Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1336 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (recognizing
that the 6th Circuit has not adopted the defense, but that even were misuse found, the plain
tiff purged itself by withdrawing the agreement); see also Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing
Antitrnst: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 40410 (1994) (charting the development of the defense).
114. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996) (in
terlocutory appeal of narrow preliminary injunction affirmed because of likelihood of copy
right misuse by plaintiff/appellant), modified sub nom. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs.,
Inc._ 166 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that DSC (now Alcatel) was guilty of copy
right misuse).
115. See Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 777. The only factual problem with this case is that DGI
made copies of DSC's software and removed them from a third-party licensee's premises.
Thus "DGI duped [the licensee] into breaching its own contract with DSC" and provided the
basis for the judgment against it for misappropriation of trade secrets. Alcatel, 166 F.3d at
785. Although the court found that the copyright law preempted the state unfair competi
tion claim, it did not address the preemption of the trade secrets claim. See id. If the court
purposefully avoided the issue, it would be understandable, because it is not an easy argu-
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finding of misuse on the fact that DSC tried to extend its copyright to
protect its unpatented hardware, something that the Copyright Act
does not protect.116 At the same time, the court affirmed the dismissal
of DGI's antitrust counterclaims, reaffirming that conduct which con
stitutes misuse need not rise to the level of an antitrust violation.117
Copyright misuse provides yet another advantage. Specifically,
courts can apply it with discretion, tailoring it to prevent the "lock up"
of a network standard and to provide a ceiling to the level of copyright
protection available in cases where there is anticompetitive conduct.
At the same time, courts may refuse to apply it in situations where in
tellectual property rights and social welfare interests are aligned.118 It
is far better for courts to have significant discretion than to stamp out
innovation with blunt antitrust remedies or harsh limitations on intel
lectual property rights.119
In order to check such discretion, some commentators advocate an
antitrust standard for misuse, meaning that only separate antitrust
Violations would rise to the level of copyright misuse.120 Such a stan
dard would, it is argued, avoid "inflicting too much damage on the
fundamental tenets of intellectual property law in the majority of cases
where network effects do not play a role" because the rule of reason
methodology in antitrust will allow the court to consider procompeti
tive justifications for and the anticompetitive effects of restraints on

ment to say that copyright misuse should trump misappropriation of trade secrets claims.
Generally, such claims survive preemption by copyright, and addressing this issue might re
quire developing a different standard for "misuse preemption," but this issue is beyond the
scope of this Note. The applicability of the misuse defense would have saved DGI from li
ability in this case were it not for its deception. This is evidenced by the Fifth Circuit's ap
proval of the initial injunction, which only prevented DGI from removing copies of DSC's
software from the premises of the licensee and explicitly allowed copying incidental to test
ing the cards. See DSC, 81 F.3d at 599-600.
116. See Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 793. In fact, although the court mentions the other devious
actions by DSC, it based its finding solely on the jury's finding of misuse and on a contract
requirement that the licensor use only DSC hardware. See id. at 778, 793.
117. See Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 777.
118. Cf. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27.
119. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of the effects of (inflexible) antitrust applica
tion on the incentive structure and innovation. Cf. Farrell and Katz, supra note 11 (con
cluding that "[p]ublic policy . . . must balance adverse effects on the incentive to improve the
interface against the positive competitive effects from sharing it once it has been created.")
(emphasis added). Implicit in such an ability to balance is sufficient discretion in fashioning
remedies.
120. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 11, at 540. The authors point to the Lotus
case as an example of potential damage to the "fundamental tenets of intellectual property,"
but fail to explain how the application of misuse would fix this problem. Id.; see also Roger
Arar, Redefining Copyright Misuse, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1310-11 (1981) ("[C]ourts
applying a misuse defense can do no better than to look to substantive antitrust princi
ples . . . .").
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trade.121 Yet, this Note argues that courts can use a rule of reason bal
ancing approach without requiring an antitrust violation. Such a bal
ancing approach is implicit in the Lasercomb language defining misuse
as occurring when "copyright is being used in a manner violative of
the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright."122 To the ex
tent that procompetitive justifications for an extension of the rights
provided by copyright violate such public policy, no problem exists,
because any extension of rights beyond those granted in copyright
should be authorized by Congress, not by the courts.123 In fact, allow
ing courts to consider such procompetitive justifications would itself
inflict too much damage on the fundamental tenets of the constitu
tional separation of powers.124 Furthermore, if courts use antitrust as a
barometer, they will miss a lot of behavior that decreases social wel
fare, such as the anticompetitive licensing provisions in Lasercomb or
DSC.125
Moreover, misuse is more narrowly tailored than either the ap
proach the Lotus court used or antitrust.126 By not invalidating the
copyright, as the Lotus court did, the misuse defense does less damage
to the "fundamental tenets of intellectual property law."127 Once the
owner has "purged itself of the misuse," it can again assert its rights.128
121. For an explication of the "Rule of Reason," see, for example, Chicago Bd. Of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (writing that "the true test of legality is
whether the restraint [of trade] imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business
to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained, are all relevant facts."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 {1911)
(announcing Rule of Reason).
122. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
123. The Constitution authorizes Congress, not the courts, to "promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
124. Article I of the United States Constitution enumerates the powers of Congress, and
the copyright and patent granting authority is contained therein. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8. On the other hand, under Article III, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803). Thus, the courts may interpret laws passed by Congress, not modify them to
extend their reach to those circumstances the judges feel are warranted.
125. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 777 {5th Cir. 1999);
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d 970. For a discussion of the implications of such behavior on social and
consumer welfare, see supra note 37.
126. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'!, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 {1st Cir. 1995) {calling
the standard an uncopyrightable "method of operation"), affd by an equally divided court,
516 U.S. 233 {1996); supra Section I.A.
127. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 11, at 540.
128. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979. See, e.g., Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1336
{N.D. Ohio 1992) (recognizing that although the Sixth Circuit has not adopted the defense,
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It seems possible that courts might achieve a just result short of
antitrust-level violations by application of the defense. For example,
the court that found West's star pagination copyrightable could have
used the copyright misuse defense as a more palatable way to allow
Lexis to use the pagination system, rather than invalidating West's
copyright, had it been suggested.129 The court could have found that
West's attempt to extend its copyright to the pagination was misuse,
and thus a defense to the infringement action it brought against Lexis.
In this way, the court could have avoided inflicting too much damage
to the intellectual property regime because it would not have had to
expand the protection of copyright to cover what was arguably not ex
pression, nor would it have had to invalidate the copyright entirely.130
Some commentators argue that because reverse engineering - as
certaining the process by which some program, device, or technology
was created by starting with the finished product and working "in re
verse" - is available, the copyright misuse defense need not often be
applied.131 There are significant problems with reverse engineering in
an open standard case, though. For one, the time it takes to reverse
engineer may amount to an insurmountable entry barrier.132 Further,
the advantage of reverse engineering is not obvious, because most of
the ideas that could be extracted with impunity already are open and
available. If a reverse engineer wanted to distill the functionality
from, for example, a Java Class Library - perhaps one that if used in
a program would produce a dialog box with an "OK" button and a

the offending anticompetitive settlement agreement would not rise to the level of misuse
under Lasercomb, but that even if it did, the plaintiff purged itself by withdrawing the
agreement). Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock Out" Technologies, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091,
1181-1198 (1995) (arguing that the application of misuse could be limited by allowing only
parties that have standing to defend with misuse).
129. See West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986); see
also supra Section I.B.
130. As to the former, see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural TeL Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991) (finding that the "white pages" are not original enough to be copyrightable under the
Constitution or the Copyright Act), after which West's copyright in its page numbers is cer
tainly questionable. The Lotus court did the latter. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l,
Inc., 49 F.3d at 815 (calling the standard an uncopyrightable "method of operation").
131. In the software context, this means starting with the object code (machine lan
guage) and "decompiling" it to come up with the human-readable source code. See Sega
Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519-27 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that reverse engi
neering of a copyrighted computer program is fair use when it is the only way to gain access
to ideas and functional elements and there is a legitimate reason for so doing); see also
Cohen, supra note 128. Professor Cohen's article deals with technological protections, one
possible way that Sun could protect Java if it closed the standard. But the Digital Millen
nium Copyright Act provides an exception for reverse engineering such protective devices.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (Supp IV 1999).
132 See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 843, 901 (1994) (stating that reverse engineering software is technically
difficult, time consuming, expensive, and yields imperfect results).
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"Cancel" button - she could easily do so. But the specifications of
that library are already freely available to her under Java's open stan
dard. If she did reverse engineer the library, she only would be per
mitted to use the ideas, not the expression of the code that enabled the
functionality.133 Most of the work involved would be in expressing this
idea, and her efforts would be futile.134
To be effective, the misuse defense must have a broad application.
Users need a way to prevent a standard holder like Sun from estab
lishing the standard, in part due to reliance on its promise of open
specifications, and then closing the standard once it is adopted. It is
worth noting that in Sun's case, should it close the standard, the opti
mal remedy would require more than just reverse engineering. The
goal would be to gain access to more than just functionality, but rather
to all that was previously open, because it would have been partly on
that basis that it was accepted as a standard. The copyright misuse de
fense provides an avenue for securing this access because without the
enforcement of its copyright, Sun would not be able to keep the speci
fications closed.
The enforcement of Java's copyright, as in Sun's dispute with Mi
crosoft, is aligned with social welfare interests because it has enabled
Sun to maintain the compatibility of its product. Microsoft, however,
has accused Sun of misuse in the lawsuit.135 This provides an example
of the defense functioning perfectly, because nothing that Sun has
done in the context of its dispute with Microsoft, nor any of the lan
guage in its license agreement, warrants the application of copyright
misuse.136 In considering the defense, the court must take Sun's mo
tives into account.137 If Sun used its copyright to lock up access to a li
censor who, like Microsoft, was taking actions that would destroy the

133. Again, the trade secrecy problem introduces interesting variations tQ the issue, be
cause Sun might try to protect its newly closed standard with secrecy, but this is beyond the
scope of this Note (as it was in Cohen's article, supra note 128).
134. The idea of producing a dialogue box is simple. Expressing this idea in code is
where the work is involved.
135. Microsoft has accused Sun of misusing its copyrights in court filings pertaining to
Sun's case against it. These accusations are evidently based upon Sun's proposed prelimi
nary injunction orders, which Microsoft argues attempt to "restrict Microsoft's competitive
use of the unprotectible [sic] subject matter in Sun's copyrighted works." Microsoft's Oppo
sition to Sun's Motion to Reinstate Preliminary Injunction Under 17 U.S.C. § 502 at § IIC,
Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C 9720884) (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/java/09-27opposition.
htin>.
136. Compare Brief of Appellant at § VII.C., Microsoft Corp. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.,
188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-15046) (visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http://www.microsoft.
com/presspass/java/01-lSappealsbrief.htin>, with Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (making no mention of Microsoft's claim of misuse).
137. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 981 (4th Cir. 1990) (dis
cussing the intentions and motivations of the parties).
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cross-platform compatibility, the application of the misuse defense
would have to fail. This is because Sun's actions would not be "viola
tive of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright,"138 but
rather in concordance with it, protecting the expression itself.
The copyright misuse defense, then, presents a more moderate and
reasonable approach to placing limits on the rights of Internet stan
dard holders. The defense can be used in a fair and balanced manner
in order to ensure that the holder of intellectual property rights does
not extend her control beyond protecting her expression. Because its
application does not require an antitrust violation, many of the con
cerns outlined above regarding the use of antitrust are not problematic
here. Moreover, it presents no danger of creating worrisome prece
dent for future standard holders, as did the Lotus decision, and it also
ensures that even the copyright holder found to have misused his
copyright is not forever barred from protecting his expression if he
rectifies the violations of public policy.
Yet although the copyright misuse defense can be helpful, it is on
such uncertain legal ground that courts may be reluctant to apply it.
Moreover, it is only a defense - it cannot compel a standard holder
like Sun to keep its specifications open. Thus, in order to maintain the
appropriate balance between incentives to innovate and consumer
welfare, additional legal remedies are needed.

III. AN EQUITABLE REMEDY: CAN ESTOPPEL lMPLY A COPYLEFT?
One issue that critics have not adequately explored is whether
courts could use the strong equity tradition in the field of intellectual
property law and apply equitable estoppel. In a case like Sun's, where
the adoption of a standard is based upon certain promises, implied or
expressed, courts could estop the promissor from asserting its legal
rights if it abrogates those promises. Part III of this Note proposes
that if a standard holder does abrogate such promises, it should be es
topped from asserting its intellectual property rights. In combination
with the application of the copyright misuse defense, this remedy will
protect innovation, the ideology of intellectual property law, and con
sumer welfare.
A "copyleft" license provides that any user must agree not to as
sert copyright to protect any improvements or changes he makes, must
distribute any changes subject to the license, and must make publicly
available the entire source code for those changes. The term was
coined by Richard Stallman as a way of using "the softw�e hoarders'
legal system" to protect the public from the copyright holders.139

138. Id. at 978.
139. Heffan, supra note 38, at 1508 nn.120-21. See also GNU Project website, supra
note 38.
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Stallman wanted to perpetuate "free" software, meaning that others
may use and improve the software if they adhere to the open source
policy.140 He faced the problem, however, that improvements on
public-domain software could be removed from the public domain and
copyrighted or patented, thereby limiting use.141 This result would be
antithetical to the purpose of providing free software, much like in
compatible changes to Java would be antithetical to its purpose. The
solution of copyleft is to copyright the software and distribute it under
a license. Such a license should be enforceable under the rubric of a
shrink-wrap license,142 where the purchaser manifests her intent to be
bound by downloading the software and distributing derivative
works.143 The copyleft license, however, is not directly applicable to
the Internet standardization problem addressed by this Note for two

140. Stallman defines "free" in terms of freedom to use and improve. Charging for the
software under a copyleft is acceptable. Heffan, supra note 38, at 1508 nn.120-21. See also
GNU Project website, supra note 38.
141. Fundamental copyright principles dictate that an "author" can base her copyright
on any works in the public domain, since they would not have the protection of copyright,
and she can copyright her work so long as there is at least some noticeable difference that is
not "merely trivial." See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-5 (2d
Cir. 1951) ("All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the
'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recogniza
bly 'his own.' . . . A copyist's bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a
clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a
variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt it as his and copyright it.''). None of this,
of course, is true if the work being copied is copyrighted, because then copying is infringe
ment Cf. supra notes 62-fJ7 and accompanying text.
142 See Heffan, supra note 38, at 1509-14. A shrink-wrap license is the license that ac
companies the purchase of most software products, its name derived from the fact that
agreement to its terms is presumed by the removal of the "shrink-wrap" around the software
box. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (defining "shrink·
wrap licenses"). Similarly, a "click-wrap" license is formed when, for an Internet purchase
of downloaded software, a consumer "clicks" "OK" or "I AGREE" at the end of the license
terms. See Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie Inc., N.Y.L.J., June 30, 1998, at 1 (N.D. Cal.,
Apr. 20, 1998) (reporting by Martin H. Samson, Click-Wrap Agreement Held Enforceable,
describing result in the case that held click-wrap licenses valid); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450-53
(holding that "shrink-wrap licenses" are enforceable).
143. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-52. Further, recent court decisions and the proposed
Article 2B have validated shrink-wrap and click-wrap licenses, wherein it is assumed that
both parties have come to a meeting of the minds. Many courts have considered the con
tract or promise itself to be an "extra element" required to remove the contract right from
the domain of the "exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright" and thus not sub
ject to preemption. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc.,
No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 16, 1998)
(reporting by Martin H. Samson, Click-Wrap Agreement Held Enforceable, describing result
in the case that held click-wrap licenses valid); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450-53 (holding that
"shrink-wrap licenses" are enforceable); National Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assocs. Int'!,
991 F.2d 426, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that license did not assert any rights equivalent
to copyright); Taquino v. Teledine Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990)
(finding contract not preempted); Lemley, supra note 37 (outlining the extent to which Arti
cle 2B would enforce shrink-wrap and other mass market licenses). But see American Movie
Classics Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding
preemption if contract claims only allege infringement of plaintiff's copyright).
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reasons. First, the license forbids the licensee from copyrighting any
improvements she makes. This requirement is not needed to balance
the interests outlined above, and, in fact, is contrary to the need for
appropriate incentives to develop and use standards; without copy
right incentives to protect their programs, for example, Java develop
ers might use another program or not develop at all.144 Second,
copyleft traditionally binds the consumer and not the licensor. Thus,
some modification to copyleft is necessary to fit the circumstances
here.
Hence, one possible avenue through which equity could enforce
promises made by standard holders like Sun is through a new type of
implied contract, a modified copyleft. At least one commentator has
viewed recent trends, such as the enforcement of shrink-wrap licenses,
as being favorable enough to the intellectual property owner that he
posits that consumers will need a consumer-protection law to counter
act those advantages.145 If the courts will validate shrink-wrap licenses,
which are essentially adhesion contracts, even where the customer's
intent to be bound by the license is not clear, then they should coun
terbalance such validation by incorporating into this contract any
promises or manifestations made by the software producer. Effec
tively, courts would be implying a copyleft contract in reverse: the
p roducer would be obligated to keep the specifications open as a con
dition of its standard being accepted by the consumers who rely on the
producer's open-source manifestations. Conventional copyleft is con
cerned with preventing consumers from destroying an open-source
policy; a modified copyleft would make this obligation mutual. Al
though many commentators have argued that shrink-wrap licenses
should not be enforceable because there is a disparity of bargaining
power between the consumer and software producer, such a modified
copyleft license should still bind companies like Sun, who clearly have
the power to influence the terms of the contract, because the
bargaining-power disparity would be moot and the result of enforcing
this type of contract would benefit, not harm, social welfare.146
Specifically in Sun's case, the company has made statements to its
licensees, to the press, and to the International Organization for Stan
dardization ("ISO") that it would always, at a minimum, fairly license

144. See Farrell & Katz, supra note 11 and supra Section I.B.
145. See Lemley, supra note 37, at 185-87. He also notes in passing the possibility of an
inlplied covenant to keep the standard platform independent. See Lemley & McGowan, su
pra note 27, at 771.
146. One of the arguments against enforcing such licenses is that they are adhesion con
tracts, so the consumer has no choice but to agree to the terms if she needs the software she has no power to bargain with the manufacturer. See David L. Hayes, Shrinkwrap Li
cense Agreements: New Light on a Vexing Problem, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 653
(1993) (discussing the validity of shrink-wrap license agreements).

Michigan Law Review

1380

[Vol. 98:1351

its technology to anyone interested.147 Sun has stated that it will pro
vide free copyright and patent licenses should Java be adopted as the
ISO standard,148 but will retain its trademark rights in Java.149 Sun also
promises to license its logo on a nondiscriminatory, fair basis to those
who pass its compatibility tests.150 Moreover, Alan Baratz, President
of Sun's Javasoft Business Unit, said:
[t]he process that Sun has been running, is running, and will continue to
keep running, is that op en industry particip ative process. It will continue
to yield open specifications for the APls, it will continue to be delivered
with free rights to the intellectual property needed to implement against
those specifications.151

The ISO, legal commentators, and industry representatives want the
guarantee of an open standard that will not be closed if adopted, 152 and
Sun has at least implied, and at most guaranteed them, that Java will
remain open.153
147. See Sun Response to ISOIIEC JTCl N4811 and N4833, § 2.4 (last modified Nov. 10,
1999) <http://java.sun.com/aboutJava/standardization/responsel.htinl>.
148.

See id. at § 22.1-2.

149.

See supra note 60.

150. Sun "agrees that conformance to International Standards is based on voluntary
declarations by suppliers. In particular, implementors of the specifications will be able to
claim that their products are 'ISO-xxxx conformant' [the name Sun proposed for the Java
ISO standard) without passing any formal external testing by Sun or any certification agency.
Those who wish to claim that their products are explicitly conformant to or compatible with
Sun's Java™ product or platform, however, may do so by entering into a licensing agree
ment witlt Sun on a fair and non-discriminatory basis on reasonable terms, as many compa
nies do." Sun Response to ISO/IEC JTCl N4811 and N4833, § 2.4 (last modified Nov. 10,
1999) <http://java.sun.com/aboutJava/standardization/responsel.html>.
Lemley and McGowan, however, worry that the market may require Java logos, in
which case this assurance may not be much help (for example, OS/2 is fairly compatible witlt
Windows, but Microsoft plays on possible only partially compatible fears). Lemley &
McGowan, supra note 27, at 767; see also Laurence Zuckerman, Sun Microsystems Rejects
Suggestions It Give Up Java, N.Y. 'IiMES, Sept. 23, 1997, at D7.
151. Q & A with Sun at Today's Press Teleconference, Sept. 22, 1997 (last modified Mar.
17, 1999) <http://java.sun.com/pr/1997/sept/qa.htinl> (emphasis added); see also ISO Mem

bers Approve Sun's PAS [Publicly Available Specification] Application: Frequently Asked
Questions (last modified Mar. 17, 1999) <http://java.sun.com/pr/1997/nov/pr971117.qna.
htinl> (responding to questions about its ISO application, Sun posted tlte following on its
website: "Q: What is Sun doing that is different from other companies tltat want tlteir tech
nologies to be standards? A: Sun is tlte first for-profit company to be approved as a PAS
[Publicly Available Specification] Submitter. Sun has set the bar very high with our open
Java specifications, our open specification development process and our commitment to
open systems."); Q & A with Sun at Today's Press Teleconference, Sept. 22, 1997, (last modi
fied Mar. 17, 1999) <http://java.sun.com/pr/1997/sept/qa.htinl> (Jim Mitchell, Vice President
of Technology and Architecture, stating that the process for considering changes is more
open than the normal ISO process and that consensus for changes to Java is necessary:
"That's why we run as open a process as we do
We can no more veto or do something
with just one company - if we do that we have killed that right to run anywhere, so our pro
cess is open because it has to be.").
. . . •

152

See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27 (outlining such objections).

153. See Industry Leaders Bring VRML, Java(TM) and JavaScript(TM) To The Web
(last modified Sept. 15, 1998) <http://java.sun.com/pr/1995/12/pr951204-02.html> ("Silicon
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Arguably, in reliance on this promise, developers have made Java
the strongest contender for the de jure and/or de facto standard cross
platform and web-based programming language. Developers want a
language that will enable them to write programs more efficiently, that
is, write them only once.154 Sun has promised them sophisticated de
velopers' kits and competition within that market,155 innovation and
adaptation of the class libraries to include increasing levels of func
tionality and compatibility with competition here as well,156 and a lan
guage that will function on each major platform.157 Consumers want
the flexibility and choice of platforms, which Sun vows to deliver
through cross-platform compatibility without the same network con
straints imposed by Windows' dominance.158
Thus, because the distribution of Sun's Java technology is accom
panied by a license, part of the formation of the contract between Sun
and the consumer would include Sun's manifestations about its intent
to keep Java an open standard.159 In other words, Sun has promised,
in essence, to copyleft its technology; it can be deemed to have dis
tributed the technology subject to implied terms similar to those of the

Graphics, Sun Microsystems and Macromedia have also agreed to work together to jointly
define a new set of open, multimedia formats and application programming interfaces
(APis). . . . Java binaries are available to developers free of charge. The Java Compiler and
Java Developer's Kit as well as the HotJava browser and related documentation are avail
able from Sun at http:l/java.sun.com. In addition, the Java source code can be licensed for a
fee.").
154. See Sun Microsystems Leads Industry Effort to Simplify XML Development {last
modified Dec. 8, 1999) <http:ffweb2.java.sun.comlprl1999112fpr991207-06.html> ("Sun also
announced the expert group of industry leaders . . . that is working to create . . . [a] proj
ect
[that] will enable developers to deliver and maintain high-performance XML-enabled
applications with a minimum of development effort. . . . Thus, not only will developers be
able to more easily develop and process Java technology-based applications that leverage
XML, but enterprises will also lower costs through more productive development.").
• • .

155. See supra note 147-151 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., TLDA, supra note 21, which allows Microsoft to develop new class li
braries incorporating Wmdows features (so long as the libraries conformed to naming speci
fications).
157. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
158. See Jon Byous, Integration and Simplicity XML and the Java™ Platform {last modi
fied Dec. 9, 1999) <http:llweb2.java.sun.comlfeaturesll999112fxml.html> ( 'In today's dot
com world, customers want to build applications with the assurance of both data and busi
ness logic interoperability within a heterogeneous environment,' said Sun's George Paolini,
vice president, Java Community Development. 'The Java 2 platform and XML provide the
open, standards-based technologies that are helping to ensure this interoperability without
locking developers into proprietary environments.' ").
"

159. Sun offers several types of licenses for its different products. Some of its technol
ogy is sold in traditional computer software outlets, where it is accompanied by a shrink
wrap license. Developers can download Sun's JDK {for free) from Sun's website after
clicking "accept," indicating acceptance of the terms of the license agreement (a click-wrap
license). For the license accompanying Sun's JDK 1.1, for example, see Sun Microsystems,
Inc., Binary Code License Agreement (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http:ffjava.sun.comlproductsf
jclkll.llLICENSE>.
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copyleft license. The license agreement together with the implied
terms would differ in some respects from a copyleft, because a Sun li
censee would be able to have some rights in its authorized derivative
works.160 It is similar, though, in that Sun would be using its intellec
tual property rights in the way that it has promised, ensuring compati
bility and innovation, but not securing a monopoly over a standard.
The essence of the copyleft license, that the software is to be distrib
uted in such a way that open source can be maintained, would remain,
as the now-public Java specifications and libraries would be immune
to efforts by Sun or others to close them. In this case, Sun would be
subject to the terms of an implied copyleft so that it could not convert
that which was open into a closed standard. If it did, it would be sub
ject to a breach of contract suit, perhaps with a specific-performance
decree requiring release of the standard.
In order to maintain the benefits to consumer welfare that open
standards provide, courts need to place some limits on the enforce
ment of intellectual property rights. This Part has proposed that the
intellectual property rights of standard holders should, by way of a
modified copyleft contract, be circumscribed by the public promises
they make during the standardization competition.161 In Sun's case, a
modified copyleft contract would be implied because Sun has publicly
championed Java's open-standard status in trying to gain its accep
tance as a standard. The result would not risk damage to the tenets of
copyright law, nor would it be unduly harsh. Sun and other such
standard-holders would only be required to honor their pledges.
CONCLUSION
The traditional methods of addressing the concerns of enforcing
intellectual property rights in standards by limiting the scope of copy
right and antitrust actions are either too severe or too weak. The pre
sumptive de facto standard status of Java, for example, has not yet ob
viated the need for full intellectual property protection. Sun's dispute
with Microsoft is clear evidence of this fact. There are many reasons
to be concerned with the implications of granting intellectual property
rights to the holder of a standard like Java, many of which have been
discussed in this Note.
Sun, for one, appears to be on the way to overcoming what may
have been the biggest obstacle to its adoption: the threat that the en
trenched market leader, Microsoft, would tip the standard to its own

160.

See TLDA, supra note 21, at § 2.10b.

161. It is true that such a standard would involve a degree of uncertainty, just as the
copyright misuse defense gives courts wide discretion. As argued at supra text accompany
ing note 119, however, such discretion is preferable to the dangers to innovation and con
sumer welfare that other options pose.
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proprietary product, either an incompatible version of Java or its own
ActiveX language. It may soon be that Sun, like other standard hold
ers, will be significantly more powerful, capable of leveraging its stan
dard into other markets, trying to extend its copyright to protect un
protectable technology, or failing to comply with its previous
promises. Two other recent developments might affect this situation
even more. First, the resolution of the Microsoft antitrust case will
likely result in a curtailing of its leveraging power, which could have
implications for all competitors for Internet standards. Second, the
purchase of Netscape by AOL and Sun may provide further control
over the network and opportunity for Sun to expand its market.
A combination of the copyright misuse doctrine and a modified
copyleft, if correctly tailored by courts, can adeptly balance the com
peting consumer welfare and incentive-to-innovate concerns. The un
questioning acceptance of Java's copyright is, at present, unproblem
atic. The power of establishing a precedent in this matter, however,
may be quite threatening. Through the discussion of antitrust, copy
right protection, misuse, and modified copyleft, perhaps the courts and
commentators will recognize that standard competitors should be
given just enough control over the standard to protect it from such
threats to its utility. It need not have the full range of rights tradition
ally granted the owner of intellectual property. The limitations this
Note has outlined will help prevent the misalignment of intellectual
property rights with broader social interests.

